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Abstract
Financial and economic crisis of 2007 began with-
out warning and in a short time spreads to more coun-
tries. America’s financial crisis impressed the eco-
nomic status of many countries. In early March 2009, 
the slow effects of the exit from the crisis were seen in 
the capital markets. This time period is the common 
timeframe of entering and exiting the crisis in the capi-
tal markets, particularly in the five countries including 
America, England, France, Germany, and Japan. The 
crisis period is considered from January 2007 to Sep-
tember 2008. Information about variables of this study 
has been collected three years before the crisis 2004-
2006 and three years after that 2009-2011. This study 
examines the relationship between the fluctuations of 
capital market indexes in the developed countries and 
corporate governance factors (institutional ownership, 
independence board and ownership concentration) in 
Tehran Stock Exchange before and after the global fi-
nancial crisis in capital markets and also comparison 
of the fluctuations of stock market indexes and corpo-
rate governance factors has been measured before and 
after the global crisis.
Keywords: financial crisis, capital markets, cor-
porate governance, fluctuations
Introduction
Capital markets are considered a symbol of eco-
nomic performance. Today, the role of Stock Exchange 
is so important that the development of a country has 
direct relation with expansion of stock market and 
its shareholders. However, the numerical value of the 
index has not much informational content, but the 
changing trend and fluctuations of stock indexes will 
represent a positive or negative market performance 
and expansion or downturn of countries. Bankruptcy 
and scandals of corporates such as Enron and World-
Com proposed the need to establish appropriatestrate-
gicsystemsto corporate as one of the main issues in all 
countries. Procedures of corporate governance are not 
identical between different countries and each country 
has its own unique corporate governance procedures 
according to factors such as financial and legal systems, 
corporate ownership structure, culture and economic 
status of individuals and investors. In financial crisis of 
2007-2008 unprecedented numbers of financial insti-
tutions were in trouble or were rescued by governments. 
America’s financial crisis occurred in the wake of a li-
quidity shortage in the banking and credit system of 
America.Banks liquidity shortage were caused by sub-
prime mortgages. Integrity of financial reporting has 
been the common concern ofstandard drafters and in-
dividuals working in the profession (especially after the 
financial scandal of reputable and well-known com-
panies such as Enron and World Com). About Asian 
countries, weak corporate governance is introduced 
as one of financial crisis reasons in 1997 in Asia. Also 
European Commission of Europe Union (EU) has 
been conducted several projects which aim to develop 
a common understanding of corporate governance. 
Yet, no attempt has been done to establish uniform 
rules to the best corporate governance procedures that 
all member of states are required to accept and adapt 
to it, and this is because, the Europe Union believes 
that the harmonization should be done after creating 
the need for it. Important implication of these studies 
is that companies’ performance affected by corporate 
governance during the crisis period. Further investiga-
tions show that companies with corporate governance 
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factor like more independent boards and higher insti-
tutional ownership have worse status toward the return 
on investment during the crisis period.
Theoretical Foundations
Ownership concentration
The term ownership in certain cultures (2005) re-
fers to the right that any human has to the object and 
can possess it in any form except what is rule exception. 
The purpose of stock ownership refers to the determi-
nation ofthe texture and composition of shareholders 
of a company and sometimes ultimate stock owner of 
that company. Many economic theorists believe that 
each type of ownership can also impact on the compa-
nies’ performance; Therefore, the methods of manag-
ers’ performance controlling and factors effecting on 
their performance and also method of measurement 
and impact of each types of ownership on companies’ 
performance are some issues that attract the share-
holders, managers and researchers attention. Owner-
ship concentration (OWNCON) refers to a condition 
that a considerable rate of the company’s has belonged 
to major shareholders (the majority) and shows what 
percentage of any company’s stock is in the hands of 
a few. Mahdavi and Haider (2005) by comparing the 
ownership concentration indicators in Iran market 
concluded that the stock market of Iran has more 
concentrated ownership structure. In addition, more 
ownership concentration in Iran has been with more 
efficiency. In other words, we can say that small own-
ership has a negative impact on efficiency and the end 
result could be that the higher ownership concentra-
tion, the greater control on managers be applied and 
improve the companies’ performance. In this study, in 
order to calculate the ratio of the ownership concen-
tration (or major shareholders), the total percentage of 
shares, shareholders who have more than five percent 
of the company’s sharesare used.
Unbound managers in Board (BRDIND)
Board is the highest decision-making source in 
organizations, both large and small. Selection and 
withdrawal of the highest executive authority, as well as 
approval of many decisions of organization and moni-
toring its implementation are done by members of the 
board. Since the responsibilities of bound members of 
board have close relation with managing director, it is 
expected the duty of management monitoring is main-
ly given to unbound members of board. Therefore, the 
unbound members of boardhave an important role in 
solving the representing problem. The efficiency of 
separation of decision making by manager and con-
trolling by the board of directorsis originatedsince 
unbound managers because of their interests are not 
willing to collude with other executive managers of 
company. Since, unbound managers mostly have ex-
ecutive positions of management with decision-mak-
ing in other companies have great motivation to earn 
a reputation as adecision-making expert and employ-
ment opportunities in the future. Non- alignment of 
bound managers’ motivation to use the owners’ wealth 
for their personal interests withunbound managers’ 
motivation to earn a reputation lead to improvement 
of company’s management monitoringbecause of un-
bound managers presence in board of directors and 
consequently will be sought the improvement of com-
pany’s performance and reduction of agency costs. 
From the current view of representation, it can be as-
sumed that unbound managers (non-executive) are 
responsible for monitoring the other board members. 
Weiss Bach (1998) found evidences that, there was a 
strong relationship between the displacement of man-
aging directors and company’s performance in com-
panies that the majority of the board was under author-
ity of unbound managers.
Institutional owners
The order of institutional ownership (INSOWN) 
is the share percentage of a stock company thatbe-
longs to banks, insurers, financial institutions, hold-
ing companies, organizations, institutions and gov-
ernmental companies. The institutional ownership in 
company is understood as a monitoring mechanism 
to the management behavior and helps the align-
ment of the interests of shareholders and managers 
and prevent any opportunisticall behavior that may 
be harmful to the shareholders in long-term. If insti-
tutional ownership be an effective observer to finan-
cial accounting process, in this case, the information 
content of accounting earnings can be increased by 
increasing the institutional ownership rate due to the 
increase in reliability of interest. In many countries, 
institutional investors have the pervasive role in fi-
nancial markets. So in many theoretical, historical 
and empirical evidence studies have been paid to ex-
amination of this role and the differences in the own-
ership structure in countries and the effect of this dif-
ference in framework of institutional investors’ role in 
corporate governance have been analyzed.
However, in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury, the institutional investors have not playeda basic 
role, yet had a significant impact on determining the 
composition of the capital markets; for example, insti-
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tutional investors in America have reached from 6.1% 
ownership in 1950, to 50% ownership in 2002. This 
event also occurred during the years 1992 to 1999 in 
Europe Unit (Yazdani, 2007). In the literature of cor-
porate governance, institutional investors have been 
known as one of the effective foreign mechanism in 
monitoring the companies. This group of capital mar-
ket participantsaccording to the having knowledge and 
adequate expertise, access to effective communica-
tion channels and required motivation to monitor the 
management performance can play an essential role in 
promotion of corporate governance system and conse-
quently in increasing the efficiency and productivity of 
company. Shleifer & Vishny (1986) point out thatthe 
presence of a large shareholder reduces the problem of 
representation in organization. Also, according to the 
researches of Gillan and Starks (2003), in countries 
that involve the presence of major shareholder in the 
ownership structure of most companies,representation 
problems caused by the separation of ownership from 
the management is not common. In fact, institutional 
investors, especially foreign institutional investors can 
play a major role in promoting corporate governance 
system. Many empirical evidence confirms the ef-
fective supervisory role of major shareholders. For 
example, Bethel, Liebeskind & Opler (1998) showed 
that, once an activist investor buys the major share of 
company, the company’s performance improves. The 
research results of Bertrand &Mullainathan (2001) in-
dicate that the presence of major shareholder on the 
board of directors lead to more control over the pay-
roll of managers.Also,the results of Mr. Midri (2002) 
indicate that, the performance of companies without 
major owner even is less than the public companies. 
Considering the center for Iranian investment insti-
tutions, according to the Exchange market law of Is-
lamic Republic, Iran has officially started its activities 
as a self-disciplined organization, by cooperation and 
systematic activities of this center, thespecialized and 
management capacity of institutional investors can be 
used in monitoringand steering of companies toen-
hance the supervision and improve performance.
Capital Market Indicators
Fluctuations of stock index indicate an increase or 
decrease in stock value over time. Investors assess the 
fluctuations of stock index prior to any transaction be-
cause one of the most important evaluation criteria of 
investment condition is the famous indicators of capi-
tal market development. However, the numerical value 
of the index, have not much informational content, but 
the changing trend and fluctuations of stock index will 
represent a positive or negative market performance 
and economical expansion or downturn. Instability of 
the financial markets has significant negative effects on 
risk averse investors. The discovery and study of factors 
affecting on the fluctuations of famous functioning in-
dicators of capital markets, provide the possibility to 
predict themduring the future periods, and individual 
and institutional traders operating in the market can 
make the proper decision.
Whenever, new information is published based on 
the financial instability or economic recession in fu-
ture, stock prices tend to declineand alsoits efficiency 
is reduced. The continuation of this situation and in-
vestors flee from the market will lead to a crisis in the 
capital markets. America’s financial crisis impressed the 
economic situation of many countries (Adamou, 2010).
S & P. index (S & P500): Public stock company 
of Standard and Poor’s is one of the most prestigious 
publishers in the world’s capital markets and money 
markets which publish 6 indexes. One of the most 
usual of them is S & P 500 index, composed of 500 
shares. For this purpose, it includes the stock of 400 
industrial companies, 40 service companies, 20 trans-
port companies and 40 financial institutions and an 
index is the market value. This index contains the 80% 
of the market value. S & P indexes are included more 
stocks than the Dow Jones and in calculation of their 
types, index has been made based on the market value 
instead of stock price. For this reason, most of capital 
market’s investors, observers and activists believe that, 
because the S & P indicators have been made based 
on the extensive foundation are better able to represent 
the market fluctuations and its general condition.
FTSE index (FTSE 100): In fact, this index is 
calculated for the London Stock Exchange’s top 
100 industrial companies.
CAC index (CAC 40): Comprehensive stock index 
in the Paris stock exchangeis based on thetop 40 com-
panies from the 100 largest stock companies.This index 
is comparable with the Dow Jones industrial index.
DAX index: This index represents the stock value 
of 30 large companies of Frankfort.
NIKKEI index (NIKKEI 225): This index calcu-
lates the mean stock value of 225 Japanese top in-
dustrial companies which based on that, the value of 
New York Stock Exchange are evaluated. 
The relation between the capital markets indicators of 
developed countries with corporate governance factor
Some of the companies have been affected by 
the crises much more than the others. Recent stud-
ies believe that the company’s risk management and 
Social science section
592 Openly accessible at http://www.european-science.com 
financing policies have a significant impact on the 
level of the companies that have been affected by the 
financial crisis(Broner Mir 2009).  Since the com-
pany’s risk management and financing policies are 
the result of fluctuation of gains and losses generated 
by the company’s board of directors and sharehold-
ers (Kaship et al 2008). An important implication of 
these studies is thatcompanies’ performance is af-
fected by corporate governance during the crisis pe-
riod.More research show companies with corporate 
governance factor like more independent board and 
higher institutional ownership have worse situation 
toward the return on investment during the crisis 
because, first, companies with higher institutional 
ownership have more risk before the crisis. This indi-
cates that morelosses of major shareholder during the 
crisis. Second, companies with more independent 
board during the crisis lead to wealth transfer from 
existing shareholders to bondholders (Ariknes et al, 
2012). The integrity of financial reporting has been 
the common concern of standard drafters and people 
working in professional (especially after the financial 
scandals of known and reputable companies such as 
Enron and World Com. About the Asian countries, 
poor corporate governance is introduced as one of the 
reasons of the financial crisis in 1997(Chen, 2008).
Development of market economies in Central and 
Eastern Europe and impending achievement of some 
of these countries to the Europe Union membership 
have reinforced this view that corporate governance 
has essential importance to the process of transition, 
economic restructuring and growth of the socialist 
countries.Shleifer and Vishny (1997) believed that ef-
fective corporate governance is createdeither through 
advancedlegal framework and active capital market or 
through concentrated ownership.This analysis was de-
veloped by Pistor & others (2000), with more emphasis 
on efficiency and effectiveness of legal institutions and 
foreign financing, on transitional economies.
Effective corporate governance is a fundamen-
tal factor in the process of rebuilding in transition 
economies. This system by adjustment of conflicts 
of interest and reduction of opportunistical and 
fraudulent behaviors improves the companies’ per-
formance, improve the quality of available infor-
mation to participants in the capital market and-
facilitate the access to foreign capital.In transition 
economies, they have had great improvements in 
corporate governance framework and have moved 
toward theadaptation to the OECD principles as 
voluntary or involuntary (Hashy, 2003).
Some corporate governance factor affect on cor-
porate performance. Companies with a particular cor-
porate factorhave been less affected by the crisis. In 
this study, crisis has been considered in capital markets 
fluctuations of developed countries. So, we want to 
know whether the fluctuations of capital market indices 
before and after the crisis can have an impact on cor-
porate governance factor or not.And,whetehrcapital 
market in Iran has been affected by these fluctuations.
The research project is financial global by using the 
after event approach (through the earlier information) 
of the stock exchange during the crisis. Empirical anal-
ysis of this study requires financial data and corporate 
governance data. In this model, dependent variables 
include institutional ownership, independent board and 
ownership concentration with fluctuations of prices in-
dex in capital market of developed countries will be ap-
plied along with appropriate control variables. Appro-
priate statistics to investigate the hypotheses of Pearson 
tests, along with the scatter plotwere used todetermine 
the relation between two variables and paired T-test was 
used to compare variables in different years.
Research hypotheses
The six research hypotheses are formulated as 
follows:
First hypothesis
There is a significant relationship between 
fluctuations of capital market indices in developed 
countries(S & P 500, FTSE 100, CAC 40, DAX and 
NIKKEI 225) in the period before the global finan-
cial crisis and the share of institutional investors in 
accepted companies in Tehran Stock Exchange.
Second hypothesis
There is a significant relationship between 
fluctuations of capital market indices in developed 
countries (S & P 500, FTSE 100, CAC 40, DAX and 
NIKKEI 225) in the period after the global financial 
crisis and the share of institutional investors in ac-
cepted companies in Tehran Stock Exchange.
Third hypothesis
There is a significant relationship between 
fluctuations of capital market indices in developed 
countries (S & P 500, FTSE 100, CAC 40, DAX and 
NIKKEI 225) in the period before the global finan-
cial crisis and the ownership concentration rate in 
accepted companies in Tehran Stock Exchange.
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Fourth hypothesis
There is a significant relationship between 
fluctuations of capital market indices in developed 
countries (S & P 500, FTSE 100, CAC 40, DAX and 
NIKKEI 225) in the period after the global financial 
crisis and the ownership concentration rate in ac-
cepted companies in Tehran Stock Exchange.
Fifth hypothesis
There is a significant relationship between 
fluctuations of capital market indices in developed 
countries (S & P 500, FTSE 100, CAC 40, DAX 
and NIKKEI 225) in the period before the global 
financial crisis and independent board in accepted 
companies in Tehran Stock Exchange.
Sixth hypothesis
There is a significant relationship between 
fluctuations of capital market indices in developed 
countries (S & P 500, FTSE 100, CAC 40, DAX and 
NIKKEI 225) in the period after the global financial 
crisis and independent board in accepted companies 
in Tehran Stock Exchange.
Research variables
In this study, all variables are continuous. The 
main variables of this study consist of corporate gov-
ernance factors and fluctuations of capital market 
indices in developed countries. In this study, there 
are three models for each of the six hypotheses.
In this model the dependent variables are the cor-
porate governance factors, including institutional own-
ership, major shareholders and independent board.
In all models, the global financial crisis in the 
capital markets which is defined as the mean of 
monthly percentage changes in indices of S & P 500 
of New York, FTSE 100 of London CAC 40 of Paris, 
DAX of Frankfurt and Tokyo’s NIKKEI 225, con-
stitute the independent variables of models.
Data analysis procedure 
The main variables of this study consist of corpo-
rate governance (institutional ownership, major share-
holders and independent board) and fluctuations of 
the capital market indexes in developed countries.
To calculate the institutional ownership,the 
amount of total shares in the hands of banks and 
insurers, holdings, investment companies, pension 
funds, funding companies and investment funds, gov-
ernmental organizations and institutions and public 
companies are divided to general treasury stockand 
the percentage of institutional ownership is obtained.
The order of ownership concentration refers to 
total percentage of ownership of shareholders who 
hold at least 5% shares (major shareholder).
To measure the independence amount of the 
board, the ratio of unbound board managers to total 
board members is used.
To calculate the global financial crisis in the capi-
tal markets which is defined as the mean of monthly 
percentage changes in indices of S & P 500 of New 
York, FTSE 100 of London CAC 40 of Paris, DAX of 
Frankfurt and Tokyo’s NIKKEI 225 are used.
The research model
In this study, three models are presented for 
each of the six hypotheses.
(Institutional ownership)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 0 1 & 500 2 100 3 40 4 5 225Y S P FTSE CAC DAX NIKKEIβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + +
(Ownership concentration)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 0 1 & 500 2 100 3 40 4 5 225Y S P FTSE CAC DAX NIKKEIβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + +
(Independent board)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )3 0 1 & 500 2 100 3 40 4 5 225Y S P FTSE CAC DAX NIKKEIβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + +
βO: Latitude of Source
β: Coefficients of the independent variables in 
the equation are calculated by statistical software.
S & P. index (S & P500): represents the value of 
the stock market in America
FTSE index (FTSE 100): indicates the value of 
the stock market in UK
CAC index (CAC 40): indicates the value of the 
stock market in France
DAX index (DAX): represents the value of the 
stock market in Germany
NIKKEI index (NIKKEI 225): represents the 
value of the stock market in Japan
εo: surplus variable 
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Institutional ownership (INSOWN): indicates 
the total percentage of shares which are in the hands 
of institutional investors.
Ownership concentration (OWNCON): in-
dicates the total percentage of shares which are in 
hands of the majority shareholders.
Board independence (BRDIND): represents the 
ratio of the unbound managers to whole managers.
In this paper, we examined the effects of fluctuations 
of capital market indices in developed countries on 
some of corporate governance factors in Tehran Stock 
Exchange, before and after the crisis periods and in-
dicators of corporate governance factors are annually 
measured from 63 active companies in Tehran Stock 
Exchange. Therefore, years 2007-2008are considered 
the crisis period. Years 2004-2006 have been used as 
the three years before the crisis and the years 2009-
2011 as the three years after the crisis.
Information related to stocks exchange indices 
of New York, London, Paris, Frankfurt and Tokyo 
has been monthly collected from Yahoo Finance 
website (www.Finance.yahoo.com) for three years 
before the crisis 2004-2006 and three years after the 
crisis 2009-2011.
Data Collection Method
Information related to stocks exchange indices 
of New York, London, Paris, Frankfurt and Tokyo 
from Yahoo Finance site and data of institutional 
ownership and ownership concentration and board 
independence from the annual reports of compa-
nies’ board, audited financial statements contained 
in the Research Site and Islamic studies of the Stock 
Exchange and softwares ofstocks reporting,policy 
processer and innovative strategy are collected.
Data Analysis Methods
The present study examinedthe relationship be-
tween the fluctuations of the capital markets in de-
veloped countries and corporate governance factors 
(institutional ownership, board independence and 
ownership concentration) in common time periods 
before and after the global financial crisis in capital 
markets which its results will be generally analyzed. 
The required data have been collected through the 
Tehran Stock Exchange companies. A description of 
the demographic indicators and research hypotheses 
are presented through tables and bar charts. Then, to 
check the assumptions the Pearson test, along with 
the scatter plot were usedto determine the relation-
ship between two variables and paired sample t-test 
was used to compare variables in different years.
First Hypothesis
According to the data analysis, it was found that 
Pearson correlation coefficient between the two vari-
ables of fluctuation of the capital markets indicesin 
developed countries in the periodsprior to the global 
financial crisis and institutionalownership prior tothe 
financial crisis is equal to -0.256 and with -p value 
(significant) is equal to 0.043, which significant is 
smaller than the significance level of α = 0.05, so, in 
this level,the null hypothesis which indicatesthe ab-
sence of the relation is rejected. Consequently, there 
is a significant relationship between fluctuations of 
capital market indices in developed countries in the 
time periods prior to the global financial crisis and 
the institutional ownership in accepted companies in 
Tehran Stock Exchange. This subject is approved due 
to the how to distribution points and the fitted line 
in Figure (1-4). Meanwhile, the negative correlation 
coefficient indicates an inverse relation between the 
two variables.Also, the coefficient of determination 
between two variables is equal to 0.0656 (R2=0.0656) 
or in other words 6.56 is the changes percent between 
the two common variables. (6.56 institutional own-
ership changes prior to the financial crisis are justi-
fied by the fluctuations of the capital market indices 
of developed countries in the time periods before the 
global financial crisis) (Table 1).
Change board independence
Fluctuations of capital market indices 
of developed countries in time periods 
after the global financial crisis
Pearson correlation coefficient R2




R P N 
+ - 0.0656
-0.256 0.043 63
Table 1. Pearson correlation test statistics related to the relation between the fluctuations of the capital 
market indices of developed countries in time periodsprior to the global financial crisis and institutional 
ownership before the financial crisis
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Second Hypothesis
According to the data analysis, it was found 
that the Pearson correlation coefficient between 
the two variables of fluctuation of the capital mar-
kets indices in developed countries in the time pe-
riods after the global financial crisis and institu-
tionalownership after the financial crisis is equal 
to -0. 145 and with -p value  (significant) is equal 
to 0.255, which significant is bigger than the sig-
nificance level of α = 0.05, so, in this level null 
hypothesis which indicate the absence of the rela-
tion is not rejected. Consequently, there is no sig-
nificant relationship between fluctuations of capi-
tal market indices in developed countries in the 
time periods after the global financial crisis and 
institutionalownership in companies accepted in 
Tehran Stock Exchange. This subject is approved 
due to the how distribution points and also the fit-
ted line in Figure (2-4). Also, the coefficient of 
determination between two variables is equal to 
0.0211 (R2=0.0211) or in other words, 2.11 is the 
percent of changes between the two common vari-
ables. (2.11 institutional ownership changes are 
justified by the fluctuations of the capital market 
indices of developed countries in the time period-
safter the global financial crisis). (Table 2).
Table 2. Statistics of Pearson correlation test related to the relation between the fluctuations of the capital 
market indices of developed countries in time periodsafter the global financial crisis and institutional ownership
Third Hypothesis
According to the data analysis, it was found 
that the Pearson correlation coefficient between 
the two variables of fluctuation of the capital mar-
kets indices in developed countries in the time pe-
riod prior to the global financial crisis and own-
ership concentration amount before the financial 
crisis is equal to -0.046 and with -p value  (signifi-
cant) is equal to 0.719, which significant is bigger 
than the significance level of α = 0.05, so, in this 
level, null hypothesis which indicates the absence 
of the relation is not rejected. Consequently, there 
is no significant relationship between fluctuations 
of capital market indices in developed countries in 
Change board independence
Fluctuations of capital market indices 
of developed countries in time periods 
after the global financial crisis
Pearson correlation coefficient R2




R P N 
- - 0.0211
-0.145 0.255 63
the time periodsprior to the global financial crisis 
and ownership concentration amountprior to the 
financial crisis in companies accepted in Tehran 
Stock Exchange. This subject is approved due to 
the how distribution points and also the fitted line. 
Also, the coefficient of determination between 
two variables is equal to 0.0021 (R2=0.0021) or 
in other words, 0.21 is the percent of changes be-
tween the two common variables. (2.11 changes 
of ownership concentration amount prior to the 
financial crisis are justified by the fluctuations of 
the capital market indices of developed countries 
in the time periodsprior to the global financial 
crisis) (Table 3).
Table 3. Statistics of Pearson correlation test related to the relation between the fluctuations of the capital 
market indices of developed countries in time periods prior to the global financial crisis and ownership 
concentration amount
Change board independence
Fluctuations of capital market indices 
of developed countries in time periods 
after the global financial crisis
Pearson correlation coefficient R2
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Fourth Hypothesis
According to the data analysis, it was clari-
fied that the Pearson correlation coefficient 
between the two variables of fluctuation of the 
capital markets indices in developed countries in 
the time periods after the global financial crisis 
and ownership concentration amount is equal 
to 0.032 and with -p value  (significant) is equal 
to 0.806, which the significant is bigger than the 
significance level of α = 0.05, therefore, in this 
level null hypothesis namely the absence of the 
relation is not rejected. Consequently, there is 
no significant relationship between fluctuations 
of capital market indices in developed coun-
tries in the time periods after the global finan-
cial crisis and ownership concentration amount 
after the financial crisis in companies accepted 
in Tehran Stock Exchange. Also, the coefficient 
of determination between two variables is equal 
to 0.0010 (R2=0.0010) or in other words, 0.10 is 
the percent of changes between the two common 
variables. (2.10 changes of ownership concentra-
tion amount are justified by the fluctuations of 
the capital market indices of developed countries 
in the time periods after the global financial cri-
sis) (Table 4).
Table 4. Statistics of Pearson correlation test related to the relation between the fluctuations of the capital 
market indices of developed countries in time periodsafter the global financial crisis and ownership 
concentration amount
Fifth Hypothesis
Based on the data analysis, it was clarified that 
the Pearson correlation coefficient between the 
two variables of fluctuation of the capital markets 
indices in developed countries in the time peri-
ods before the global financial crisis and board 
independence after the financial crisis is equal to 
- 0.133 and with -p value  (significant) is equal to 
0.297, which the significant is bigger than the sig-
nificance level of α = 0.05, therefore, in this level 
null hypothesis namely the absence of the relation 
is accepted. Consequently, there is no significant 
Change board independence
Fluctuations of capital market indices 
of developed countries in time periods 
after the global financial crisis
Pearson correlation coefficient R2




R P N 
- - 0.0010
0.032 0.806 63
relationship between fluctuations of capital market 
indices in developed countries in time periodsprior 
to the global financial crisis and board indepen-
dence in companies accepted in Tehran Stock Ex-
change. Also, the coefficient of determination be-
tween two variables is equal to 0.0178 (R2=0.0178) 
or in other words, 1.78 is the percent of changes 
between the two common variables. (1.78 changes 
of board independence are justified by the fluctua-
tions of the capital market indices of developed 
countries in the time periods prior to the global fi-
nancial crisis) (Table 5).
Table 5. Statistics of Pearson correlation test related to the relation between the fluctuations of the 
capital market indices of developed countries in time periodsprior to the global financial crisis and board 
independence.
Change board independence
Fluctuations of capital market indices 
of developed countries in time periods 
after the global financial crisis
Pearson correlation coefficient R2




R P N 
- - - 0.133
-0.133 0.297 63
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Sixth Hypothesis
Based on the data analysis, it was clarified that 
the Pearson correlation coefficient between the two 
variables of fluctuation of the capital markets indices 
in developed countries in the time periods after the 
global financial crisis and board independence after 
the financial crisis is equal to  0.249 and with -p value 
(significant) is equal to 0.049, which the significant is 
smaller than the significance level of α = 0.05, there-
fore, null hypothesis namely the absence of the rela-
tion is rejected in this level. Consequently, there is a 
significant relationship between fluctuations of capital 
market indices in developed countries in time periods 
after the global financial crisis and board independence 
in companies accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange. 
Meanwhile, positivity of the correlation coefficients 
indicates the direct relation between these two vari-
ables. Also, the coefficient of determination between 
two variables is equal to 0.0622 (R2=0.0622) or in other 
words, 6.22 is the percentage of changes between the 
two common variables. (6.22 changes of board inde-
pendence are justified by the fluctuations of the capital 
market indices of developed countries in the time peri-
ods after the global financial crisis)(Table 6).
Table 6. Statistics of Pearson correlation test related to the relation between the fluctuations of the capital 
market indices of developed countries in time periodsafter the global financial crisis and board independence 
after the financial crisis
Results 
First hypothesis
This hypothesis was tested and the results of 
statistical analyzes suggest that this hypothesis is 
accepted and institutional ownership establishes a 
verse and significant relation with fluctuations of-
capital market indicators of developed countries 
in the periods before the global financial crisis.But 
because of the low R2 and the obtained results in 
equality of means this hypothesis can be considered 
as a rejected.
Second Hypothesis
This hypothesis was tested and the results of 
statistical analyzes indicate that this hypothesis is 
rejected and institutional ownership did not estab-
lish a significant relation with fluctuations of capital 
market indicators of developed countries in the time 
periods after the global financial crisis.
Third Hypothesis
This hypothesis was tested and the results of sta-
tistical analyzes indicate that this hypothesis is re-
jected and ownership concentration did not estab-
lish a significant relation with fluctuations of capital 
Change board independence
Fluctuations of capital market indices 
of developed countries in time periods 
after the global financial crisis
Pearson correlation coefficient R2




R P N 
- - 0.0622
0.249 0.049 63
market indicators of developed countries in the time 
periodsprior to the global financial crisis.
Fourth Hypothesis
The hypothesis testing and obtained results of 
statistical analyzes indicate that this hypothesis is 
rejected and ownership concentration did not estab-
lish a significant relation with fluctuations of capital 
market indicators of developed countries in the time 
periods after the global financial crisis.
Fifth Hypothesis
The hypothesis testing and obtained results of 
statistical analyzes indicate that this hypothesis is 
rejected and board independence did not establish a 
significant relation with fluctuations of capital mar-
ket indicators of developed countries in the time pe-
riods prior to the global financial crisis.
Sixth Hypothesis
This hypothesis was tested and the results of 
statistical analyzes indicate that this hypothesis is 
rejected and board independence establish a sig-
nificant and positive relation with fluctuations of 
capital market indicators of developed countries in 
the time periods after the global financial crisis. But 
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because of the low R2 and the obtained results in 
equality of means this hypothesis can be considered 
as a rejected.
Discussion and conclusions
Since, there is an reverse and significant relation-
ship between institutional ownership and fluctuations 
of the capital markets in developed countries before 
the crisis, but this hypothesis is rejected because of 
low R2 and the obtained results in equality of means. 
Also, there is no significant relationship between in-
stitutional ownership and fluctuations of the capital 
markets in developed countries after the crisis, and 
given that the institutional ownership after the crisis 
is more than the institutional ownership prior to the 
crisis. This enhancement of institutional ownership 
after the crisis than before the crisis lead to improv-
ing theperformance of companies accepted in Tehran 
Stock Exchange and this has led the impact of global 
financial crisis be lower on the capital market in Iran.
There is no significant relation between ownership 
concentration (major shareholders) and capital mar-
kets fluctuations in developed countries, before and af-
ter the crisis. Because the ownership concentration in 
accepted companies in Tehran Stock Exchange is high 
and shares in hand of major shareholders is more than 
theavailable stock of small shareholders, therefore, 
before and after the crisis has not changed so much. 
Since, the ownership concentration of accepted com-
panies in Tehran Stock Exchange have been high and 
impressive, this can be an effective agent for improving 
performance of companies and this caused the effect 
of global financial crisis be lower on the capital market 
in Iran or affect with delay.
There is no significant relation between board inde-
pendence and capital markets fluctuations in developed 
countries, before and after the crisis, but this relation is 
positive and significant after the crisis. But because of 
the low R2 and the obtained results in equality of means, 
this hypothesis can be considered as a rejected,and given 
that the percentage of independent board after the crisis 
is more than the before crisis, this leads to more risk-
taking decisions of board and therefore better perfor-
mance of companies. But in crisis situations because of 
higher risk, companies experience the crisis.
Suggestions for further research
1. Investigating the relationship of other corpo-
rate governance factors (influence of managing di-
rector, audit type and the board’s size) during the 
before and after the global financial crisis, with cap-
ital markets fluctuation in developed countries
2. Studying the relation of corporate governance 
factors (institutional ownership, board indepen-
dence and ownership concentration) during the be-
fore and after the global financial crisis, with capital 
markets fluctuation in Iran. 
3. Studying the relation of corporate governance 
factors (institutional ownership, board indepen-
dence and ownership concentration) during the be-
fore and after the global financial crisis, with capital 
markets fluctuation in East Asia countries.
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